I purchased this stock back in December 2017 @ $\$ 45.95$. These are my thoughts after reviewing this when I completed my initial purchase in 2017:



 opportunity.



 natural gas power plant business dries up they can just convert over and start building in other spaces (they are just choosing not to now)


 60 years (and is well run) won't be able to find new business.


 going forward.
 stock in the company. I like that basically no one follows this company. I like the high ROIC and ROE.


 company have many characteristics the make it better than the overall market? I think yes, so maybe that is reason enough. This is where investing is just really hard.


 At this point l'll probably hold onto it rather than sell it and not have anywhere to reallocate the money to. But if I find something better to replace it with, I will do that without much hesitation.


## Certainty Rating

| Test \#0 - SUPER QUICK VALUATION | 29\% |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Estimated 'Intrinsic Value' Between: Between \$17.85 ( $37 \%$ of current price) and $\$ 30.28$ ( $63 \%$ of current price) Expected Return: $4.1 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Test \#1-SCREEN SELECTION | 74\% |  |  |  |  |
| Valuation Score | 16.45 | 66\% | Quality Score 23.40 | 82\% |  |
| Test \#2 - INDUSTRY METRICS COMPARE | 92\% |  |  |  |  |
| Average: | 92\% |  |  |  |  |
| Test \#3 - PRICE HISTORY COMPARE | 51\% |  |  |  |  |
| Price/Earnings: 90\% | Price/Sales: | 25\% | Price/Free CF: 0\% | Price/Book: | 90\% |
| Test \#4 - VALUATION SCENARIOS | 29\% |  |  |  |  |
| Best Case - Expected Return: Stress Test - Expected Return: | $\begin{aligned} & 4.6 \% \\ & 3.1 \% \end{aligned}$ | Last 10 Year Average - Expected Return: Combined - Expected Return: |  | $\begin{aligned} & 4.1 \% \\ & 4.0 \% \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Test \#5 - FINANCIALS REVEW | 73\% |  |  |  |  |
| Sales Growth: Earnings Growth: Sales Per Share Growth: Earnings Per Share Growth: | $\begin{aligned} & 65 \% \\ & 80 \% \\ & 65 \% \\ & 80 \% \end{aligned}$ | Gross Profit: Operating Margin: Cap Ex: Free Cash Flow: | $70 \%$  <br> $70 \%$ Divid <br> $100 \%$  <br> $0 \%$  | bt To Equity: Sustainability: | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \% \\ & 100 \% \end{aligned}$ |
| Test \#6-BUYING / OWNERSHIP | 88\% |  |  |  |  |
| Shares Outstanding / Buyback Program: | 75\% |  | Insider Ownership / Activity: | 100\% |  |
| Test \#7-GOOD BUSINESS CHECK |  |  |  |  |  |
| Return "Moat" Assessment: Business "Moat" Assessment: Competition "Moat" Assessment: | $\begin{aligned} & 86 \% \\ & 61 \% \\ & 40 \% \end{aligned}$ |  | Leverage Assessment: Compounding Assessment: Management Assessment: | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \% \\ & 75 \% \\ & 100 \% \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Test \#8 - MY GUT | 100\% |  |  |  |  |
| Other's Analysis: 100\% | PROS: CONS: | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \% \\ & 100 \% \end{aligned}$ | Management Assessment: <br> Moat / Competition Assessment: |  | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \% \\ & 40 \% \end{aligned}$ |
| Test \#9-TECHNICALS / TIMING | 100\% |  |  |  |  |
| Point \& Figure: | 100\% | $\begin{aligned} & 50 / 200 \text { Day: } \\ & \text { RSI: } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \% \\ & 100 \% \end{aligned}$ | MACD <br> Money Flow: | $\begin{aligned} & 100 \% \\ & 100 \% \end{aligned}$ |
| Certainty Grand Total: | 71\% |  |  |  |  |

# Test \#0 - SUPER QUICK VALUATION - Expected Case - Based On 1) NPV Earnings, 2) 5 Year DCF Free Cash Flow, 3) 10 Year NPV Cash Flow. <br> Tells Us Quickly If It Makes Sense To Even Dive Deeper (No Sense In Investing Unless Margin Of Safety Exists And Likelihood Of Decent Returns Is High). <br> Multiples Of RFRR Are Good (Meaing This Model Kicks Out Higher Certainty Ratings For Higher Multiples). 

## Net Present Value Calculator (AKA Ben Graham Formula) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

| 20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate | $4.0 \%$ | https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA | Last Updated: | 1/3/19 |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EPS | $\$ 2.10$ |  |  |  |
| Constant PE (0\% perpetual growth) | 8.5 |  |  |  |
| Company's Perpetual Growth Rate | $0.0 \%$ |  | Last Updated: | $1 / 3 / 19$ |
| Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return | $2.4 \%$ | https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula) | $\$ 17.85$ |  |  |  |
| \% of Current Price | $37 \%$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) | $\$ 30.28$ |  |  |  |
| \% of Current Price | $63 \%$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |  |

## 5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

| Perpetual Growth Rate |  | 0.0\% | Explanation: | Run at zero perpetual growth to be super conservative. |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Discount Rate/WACC | PV of CFs | + Terminal Value | = PV |  |
| Last 3 Year Average: | \$1.85 | 3.8\% | \$8.27 | \$49.21 | \$47.73 | 0.1\% |
| Last 10 Year Average: | \$2.28 | 4.6\% | \$9.96 | \$49.47 | \$47.73 | 0.1\% |
|  |  | 4.2\% |  |  |  |  |
|  | Year | FCFPS |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2008 |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2009 | -\$2.81 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2010 | \$1.38 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2011 | \$5.58 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2012 | \$4.41 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2013 | \$0.99 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2014 | \$10.58 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2015 | -\$2.91 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2016 | \$12.68 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2017 | \$2.94 |  |  |  |  |
|  | 2018 | -\$10.08 | TTM FCF: | -\$157,000,000 |  |  |

Explanation: NA

| Return On Shareholder's Equity | $9.1 \%$ |  |
| ---: | :--- | :--- |
| Retained To Equity | $9.1 \%$ | $100 \%$ |
| Dividends Percent | $0.0 \%$ |  |



| Certainty Rating |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| $37 \%$ | Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula) |
| $63 \%$ | Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) |
| $15 \%$ | 5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow |
| $15 \%$ | 10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows |
| $15 \%$ | Average |
| $29 \%$ | Total |


| Hurdle Returns (vs. Risk Free) |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $2.4 \%$ | $0 x$ | $0 \%$ |
| $4.7 \%$ | $1 x$ | $15 \%$ |
| $7.1 \%$ | $2 x$ | $30 \%$ |
| $9.5 \%$ | $3 x$ | $45 \%$ |
| $11.9 \%$ | $4 x$ | $60 \%$ |
| $14.2 \%$ | $5 x$ | $75 \%$ |
| $16.6 \%$ | $6 x$ | $90 \%$ |
| $19.0 \%$ | $7 x$ | $105 \%$ |
| $21.3 \%$ | $8 x$ | $120 \%$ |

Explanation: NA

Valuation Scoring (Max Possible Score 25.25)

|  |  | 3.00 | Base (+5) - PE (FYF) vs. Market PE |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 5.00 | Base (+5) - PE (FYF) vs. Industry |
| 16.45 | Total Valuation Score | 5.00 | Base (+5) - PE (FYF) vs. Static Hurdle (Case Shiller Mean) |
| 65\% | Percent of Max Possible Score | 0.80 | Extra Credit (+1) - PE (TTM) vs. Market PE |
| 67\% | Percent of Current Universe | 1.00 | Extra Credit (+1) - PE (MRFY) vs. Market PE |
| 66\% | Combined | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+1) - Sales (TTM) vs. Industry |
|  |  | 0.40 | Extra Credit (+1) - CF (MRFY) vs. Industry |
|  |  | 1.00 | Extra Credit ( +1 ) - CF (MRFY) vs. Market |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit ( +1 ) - BV (MRQ) vs. Industry |
| Certainty R | Rating | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+2) - PEG (TTM) vs. Market |
| Valuation: | 66\% | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - Schwab |
| Quality: | 82\% | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - Morningstar |
| Combined: | 74\% | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - Credit Suisse |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - Ned Davis |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - S\&P Cap IQ Earnings and Div Rank |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - S\&P CFRA |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - Argus |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - Market Edge |
|  |  | 0.25 | Extra Credit (+.25) - Analyst - Reuters |

## Quality Scoring (Max Possible Score 26.50)

|  |  | 1.00 | Base (+1) - Positive PE (FYF) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | 1.00 | Base (+1) - Positive Net Profit Margin |
| 23.40 | Total Quality Score | 1.00 | Base (+1) - Positive Price To Cash Flow |
| 88\% | Percent of Max Possible Score | 1.00 | Base (+1) - Positive Cash Flow Per Share |
| 76\% | Percent of Current Universe | 1.00 | Base (+1) - Positive ROE |
| 82\% | Combined | 1.00 | Base (+1) - Positive ROI |
|  |  | 0.00 | Base (+1) - Quick Ratio Greater Than Static Hurdle |
| Explanation: NA |  | 0.00 | Base (+1) - Quick Ratio Higher Than Industry |
|  |  | 1.50 | Base (+1) - Current Ratio Greater Than Static Hurdle |
|  |  | 1.50 | Base (+1) - Current Ratio Higher Than Industry |
|  |  | 5.00 | Base (+5) - Debt To Equity Lower Than Static Hurdle |
|  |  | 5.00 | Base (+5) - Debt To Equity Lower Than Industry |
|  |  | 1.50 | Base (+1) - Net Profit Margin Higher Than Industry |
|  |  | 0.00 | Base (+1) - Industry ROE vs. Market ROE |
|  |  | 1.40 | Base (+1) - ROE vs. Industry |
|  |  | 0.00 | Base (+1) - Industry ROI vs. Market ROI |
|  |  | 1.50 | Base (+1) - ROI vs. Industry |
|  |  | 0.00 | Base (+1) - Market Cap |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25\%) - Morningstar Moat |
|  |  | 0.00 | Extra Credit (+.25\%) - Morningstar Stewardship |

Industry: Construction \& Engineering
Number of Companies In Industry: 27

|  | Industry | Stock |  |  |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Average Price/Earnings (FYF): | 23.4 | 11.0 | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Price/Earnings (TTM): | 20.9 | 9.8 | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Price/Earnings (MRFY): | 24.4 | 8.4 | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Price/Book (MRQ): | 1.6 | 1.5 | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Price/Sales (TTM): | 0.7 | 1.0 | Worse | $0 \%$ |
| Average Price/Cash Flow (MRFY): | 10.9 | 7.8 | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average PEG (TTM): | 9.1 | NA | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Debt To Equity (MRQ): | $62.0 \%$ | $0.0 \%$ | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Net Profit Margin (MRFY): | $0.2 \%$ | $8.0 \%$ | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Return On Equity (TTM): | $11.5 \%$ | $16.2 \%$ | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Return On Assets (MRFY): | $3.4 \%$ | $10.6 \%$ |  |  |
| Average Quick Ratio (MRQ): | 1.7 | NA | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Current Ratio (MRQ): | 2.0 | 4.4 | Better | $100 \%$ |
| Average Cash Flow Per Share (TTM): | $\$ 3.26$ | $\$ 4.13$ |  |  |
|  |  |  | Average (Certainty Rating): | $92 \%$ |

Explanation: NA

| Historical Pricing |  |  |  |  |  | Max Price Movements |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | High Price | Low Price | Volume | Shares Out |  | Drawdown | Gain |
| 2008 | \$18.74 | \$8.50 | 22,232 | 13,000,000 | 0\% | 55\% | 120\% |
| 2009 | \$16.00 | \$8.37 | 17,657 | 14,000,000 | 0\% | 48\% | 91\% |
| 2010 | \$16.26 | \$7.40 | 21,238 | 14,000,000 | 0\% | 54\% | 120\% |
| 2011 | \$17.55 | \$8.20 | 19,649 | 14,000,000 | 0\% | 53\% | 114\% |
| 2012 | \$19.71 | \$12.59 | 67,559 | 14,000,000 | 0\% | 36\% | 57\% |
| 2013 | \$27.76 | \$13.90 | 69,853 | 14,000,000 | 0\% | 50\% | 100\% |
| 2014 | \$40.99 | \$26.09 | 105,602 | 14,000,000 | 1\% | 36\% | 57\% |
| 2015 | \$42.50 | \$29.63 | 106,904 | 15,000,000 | 1\% | 30\% | 43\% |
| 2016 | \$75.35 | \$28.03 | 162,755 | 16,000,000 | 1\% | 63\% | 169\% |
| 2017 | \$76.70 | \$41.79 | 179,115 | 16,000,000 | 1\% | 46\% | 84\% |
| 2018 | \$47.53 | \$34.90 | 198,335 | 16,000,000 | 1\% | 27\% | 36\% |
| Average: | \$36.28 | \$19.95 |  |  |  | 45\% | 82\% |
| Max: | \$76.70 | \$41.79 |  |  |  | 46\% | 84\% |
| Min: | \$16.00 | \$7.40 |  |  |  | 54\% | 116\% |
| AT High vs. AT Low: | \$76.70 | \$7.40 |  |  |  | 90\% | 936\% |



Explanation: NA

|  | Price to Earnings Over Time |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | EPS | Earnings | High PE | Low PE |
| 2008 | $\$ 0.77$ | $\$ 10,000,000$ | 24.4 | 11.1 |
| 2009 | $\$ 0.50$ | $\$ 7,000,000$ | 32.0 | 16.7 |
| 2010 | $\$ 0.57$ | $\$ 8,000,000$ | 28.5 | 13.0 |
| 2011 | $\$ 0.64$ | $\$ 9,000,000$ | 27.3 | 12.8 |
| 2012 | $\$ 1.64$ | $\$ 23,000,000$ | 12.0 | 7.7 |
| 2013 | $\$ 2.86$ | $\$ 40,000,000$ | 9.7 | 4.9 |
| 2014 | $\$ 2.14$ | $\$ 30,000,000$ | 19.1 | 12.2 |
| 2015 | $\$ 2.40$ | $\$ 36,000,000$ | 17.7 | 12.3 |
| 2016 | $\$ 4.38$ | $\$ 70,000,000$ | 17.2 | 6.4 |
| 2017 | $\$ 4.50$ | $\$ 72,000,000$ | 17.0 | 9.3 |
| 2018 | $\$ 3.81$ | $\$ 61,000,000$ | 12.5 | 9.2 |
| Average: | $\$ 2.20$ | $\$ 33,272,727$ |  |  |
| Max: | $\$ 4.50$ | $\$ 72,000,000$ | 19.8 | 10.5 |
| Min: | $\$ 0.50$ | $\$ 7,000,000$ | 32.0 | 16.7 |


| Certainty <br> Rating | $90 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: |



Explanation: At $12.5 x$ it is trading near the average low of $10.5 x$

|  | Price to Sales Over Time |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | SPS | Sales | High PS | Low PS |
| 2008 | $\$ 17.00$ | $\$ 221,000,000$ | 1.1 | 0.5 |
| 2009 | $\$ 16.57$ | $\$ 232,000,000$ | 1.0 | 0.5 |
| 2010 | $\$ 13.07$ | $\$ 183,000,000$ | 1.2 | 0.6 |
| 2011 | $\$ 10.14$ | $\$ 142,000,000$ | 1.7 | 0.8 |
| 2012 | $\$ 19.93$ | $\$ 279,000,000$ | 1.0 | 0.6 |
| 2013 | $\$ 16.21$ | $\$ 227,000,000$ | 1.7 | 0.9 |
| 2014 | $\$ 27.36$ | $\$ 383,000,000$ | 1.5 | 1.0 |
| 2015 | $\$ 27.53$ | $\$ 413,000,000$ | 1.5 | 1.1 |
| 2016 | $\$ 42.19$ | $\$ 675,000,000$ | 1.8 | 0.7 |
| 2017 | $\$ 55.81$ | $\$ 893,000,000$ | 1.4 | 0.7 |
| 2018 | $\$ 35.25$ | $\$ 564,000,000$ | 1.3 | 1.0 |


| Average: | $\$ 25.55$ | $\$ 382,909,091$ | 1.4 | 0.8 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| Max: | $\$ 55.81$ | $\$ 893,000,000$ | 1.8 | 1.1 |
| Min: | $\$ 10.14$ | $\$ 142,000,000$ | 1.0 | 0.5 |


| Certainty <br> Rating | $25 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: |



Explanation: At 1.4 x this is trading at near the average high.


Explanation: At $1.9 x$ this is near the averag low of $1.5 x$ and well off the high of $2.8 x$.

| Price to Free Cash Flow Over Time |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year | FCFPS | Free Cash Flow | High FCFPS | Low FCFPS |
| 2008 | $\$ 0.00$ | $\$ 0$ | \#DIV/O! | \#DIV/0! |
| 2009 | $-\$ 2.81$ | $-\$ 39,340,000$ | -5.7 | -3.0 |
| 2010 | $\$ 1.38$ | $\$ 19,320,000$ | 11.8 | 5.4 |
| 2011 | $\$ 5.58$ | $\$ 78,120,000$ | 3.1 | 1.5 |
| 2012 | $\$ 4.41$ | $\$ 61,740,000$ | 4.5 | 2.9 |
| 2013 | $\$ 0.99$ | $\$ 13,860,000$ | 28.0 | 14.0 |
| 2014 | $\$ 10.58$ | $\$ 148,120,000$ | 3.9 | 2.5 |
| 2015 | $-\$ 2.91$ | $-\$ 43,650,000$ | -14.6 | -10.2 |
| 2016 | $\$ 12.68$ | $\$ 202,880,000$ | 5.9 | 2.2 |
| 2017 | $\$ 2.94$ | $\$ 47,040,000$ | 26.1 | 14.2 |
| 2018 | $-\$ 10.08$ | $-\$ 161,335,902$ | -4.7 | -3.5 |


| Average: | $\$ 2.07$ | $\$ 29,704,918$ | \#DIV/0! | \#DIV/0! |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :--- |
| Max: | $\$ 12.68$ | $\$ 202,880,000$ | \#DIV/0! | \#DIV/0! |
| Min: | $-\$ 10.08$ | $-\$ 161,335,902$ | \#DIV/0! | \#DIV/0! |


| Certainty <br> Rating | $0 \%$ |
| :---: | :---: |

Historical Price To Free Cash Flow


Explanation: This company doesn't hold debt and will have pretty wild swings in cash flows due to project timing. Negative now due to decreasing revenue and declining pipeline. Regardless, no certainty whatsoever here.

## Best Case (with expected growth)

## Net Present Value Calculator (AKA Ben Graham Formula) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

| 20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate | $4.0 \%$ | https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA | Last Updated: |
| ---: | :---: | :--- | :--- |
| EPS | $\$ 2.74$ |  | 1/3/19 |
| Constant PE (0\% perpetual growth) | 8.5 |  | Last Updated: |
| Company's Perpetual Growth Rate | $0.0 \%$ |  | $1 / 3 / 19$ |
| Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return | $2.4 \%$ | https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula) | $\$ 23.29$ |  |  |
| \% of Current Price | $49 \%$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) | $\$ 39.50$ |  |  |
| \% of Current Price | $83 \%$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |

## 5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Expected Growth)

| Perpetual Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $0.0 \%$ | Explanation: | NA |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Discount Rate/WACC | PV of CFs | + Terminal Value | $=$ PV |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Morningstar Current | $\$ 1.85$ | $3.8 \%$ | $\$ 8.27$ | $\$ 49.21$ | $\$ 47.73$ | $0.1 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |
| Brokerage CF (TTM) | $\$ 2.28$ | $4.6 \%$ | $\$ 9.96$ | $\$ 49.47$ | $\$ 47.73$ | $0.1 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |

Explanation: NA
10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows (Run Assuming Updated EPS (using best case future annual estimate) \& DPS and Expected Growth)

| Return On Shareholder's Equity | $11.9 \%$ |  |
| ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Retained To Equity | $11.9 \%$ | $100 \%$ |
| Dividends Percent | $0.0 \%$ |  |


$\$ 89.41$
$\$ 66.79$
$\$ 53.27$
$\$ 44.30$
$\$ 37.93$
\$33.16
\$29.47
\$26.53
\$24.13
\$22.13
\$20.44
\$19.00
\$17.75
\$16.66
\$15.70
\$14.85
\$14.08
\$13.39
\$12.77
\$12.20
\$11.68
\$11.21
\$10.77

NPV of future cashflows $\$ 271.5$ $\$ 134.84$

Expected Return - 5 Year DCF Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows Expected Return Averag

1\% In Money
2\% In Money
3\% In Money
4\% In Money
5\% In Money
6\% Too Expensive
7\% Too Expensive 8\% Too Expensive 9\% Too Expensive 10\% Too Expensive 11\% Too Expensive 12\% Too Expensive 13\% Too Expensive 14\% Too Expensive 15\% Too Expensive 16\% Too Expensive 17\% Too Expensive 18\% Too Expensive 19\% Too Expensive 20\% Too Expensive 21\% Too Expensive 22\% Too Expensive 23\% Too Expensive 24\% Too Expensive 25\% Too Expensive
4.6\%

| Certainty Rating |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| $49 \%$ | Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula) |
| $83 \%$ | Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) |
| $15 \%$ | 5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow |
| $30 \%$ | 10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows |
| $15 \%$ | Average |
| $38 \%$ | Total |


| Hurdle |  |  |  | Returns (vs. Risk Free) |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $2.4 \%$ | $0 x$ | $0 \%$ |  |  |
| $4.7 \%$ | $1 x$ | $15 \%$ |  |  |
| $7.1 \%$ | $2 x$ | $30 \%$ |  |  |
| $9.5 \%$ | $3 x$ | $45 \%$ |  |  |
| $11.9 \%$ | $4 x$ | $60 \%$ |  |  |
| $14.2 \%$ | $5 x$ | $75 \%$ |  |  |
| $16.6 \%$ | $6 x$ | $90 \%$ |  |  |
| $19.0 \%$ | $7 x$ | $105 \%$ |  |  |
| $21.3 \%$ | $8 x$ | $120 \%$ |  |  |

Explanation: Using the average of the analyst for the coming two years.

Explanation: NA

## Net Present Value Calculator (AKA Ben Graham Formula) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

| 20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate | $4.0 \%$ | https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA | Last Updated: |
| ---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| EPS | $\$ 1.05$ |  | 1/3/19 |
| Constant PE (0\% perpetual growth) | 8.5 |  | Last Updated: |
| Company's Perpetual Growth Rate | $0.0 \%$ |  | $1 / 3 / 19$ |
| Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return | $2.4 \%$ | https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula) | $\$ 8.93$ |  |  |
| \% of Current Price | $19 \%$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) | $\$ 15.14$ |  |  |
| \% of Current Price | $32 \%$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |

## 5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

| Perpetual Growth Rate |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | $0.0 \%$ | Explanation: | Run at zero perpetual growth to be super consern |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Discount Rate/WACC | PV of CFs | + Terminal Value | $=$ PV |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Morningstar Current | $\$ 1.85$ | $3.8 \%$ | $\$ 8.27$ | $\$ 49.21$ | $\$ 47.73$ | $0.1 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Brokerage CF (TTM) | $\$ 2.28$ | $4.6 \%$ | $\$ 9.96$ | $\$ 49.47$ | $\$ 47.73$ | $0.1 \%$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Explanation: NA
10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows (Run Assuming Updated EPS (using $1 / 2$ best case future annual estimate) \& DPS and Zero Growth)

| Return On Shareholder's Equity | $4.6 \%$ |  |
| ---: | :--- | :--- |
| Retained To Equity | $4.6 \%$ | $100 \%$ |
| Dividends Percent | $0.0 \%$ |  |


|  | Base | EquityPS | Earnings | EarningsPS | Dividends |  | DivsPS | Added To Base | RetainedPS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2018 | \$358,888,500 | \$23.05 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2019 | \$375,237,000 | \$24.10 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2020 | \$391,585,500 | \$25.15 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2021 | \$407,934,000 | \$26.20 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2022 | \$424,282,500 | \$27.25 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2023 | \$440,631,000 | \$28.30 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2024 | \$456,979,500 | \$29.35 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2025 | \$473,328,000 | \$30.40 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2026 | \$489,676,500 | \$31.45 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2027 | \$506,025,000 | \$32.50 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |
| 2028 | \$522,373,500 | \$33.55 | \$16,348,500 |  | \$1.05 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$16,348,500 | \$1.05 |


| NPV of future cashflows | $\$ 104.07$ | $1 \%$ In Money |
| :--- | ---: | :--- |
| $\$ 51.67$ | $2 \%$ In Money |  |
| $\$ 34.26$ | $3 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 25.59$ | $4 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 20.42$ | $5 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 16.98$ | $6 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 14.53$ | $7 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 12.71$ | $8 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 11.29$ | $9 \%$ Too Expensive | Explanation: NA |
| $\$ 10.17$ | $10 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 9.25$ | $11 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 8.48$ | $12 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 7.83$ | $13 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 7.28$ | $14 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 6.80$ | $15 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 6.39$ | $16 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 6.02$ | $17 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 5.69$ | $18 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 5.40$ | $19 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 5.13$ | $20 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| $\$ 4.89$ | $21 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| 24.68 | $22 \%$ Too Expensive |  |
| 24.48 | $\$ 4.30$ | $24 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 4.13$ | $25 \%$ Too Expensive |  |

Expected Return-5 Year DCF 4.2\%
Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows $2 \%$ Expected Return Average 3.1\%

## Certainty Rating

| Certainty Rating |  |
| :---: | :--- |
| $19 \%$ | Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula) |
| $32 \%$ | Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) |
| $15 \%$ | 5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow |
| $0 \%$ | 10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows |
| $15 \%$ | Average |
| $16 \%$ | Total |


| Hurdle Returns (vs. Risk Free) |  |  |
| ---: | :---: | :---: |
| $2.4 \%$ | $0 x$ | $0 \%$ |
| $4.7 \%$ | $1 x$ | $15 \%$ |
| $7.1 \%$ | $2 x$ | $30 \%$ |
| $9.5 \%$ | $3 x$ | $45 \%$ |
| $11.9 \%$ | $4 x$ | $60 \%$ |
| $14.2 \%$ | $5 x$ | $75 \%$ |
| $16.6 \%$ | $6 x$ | $90 \%$ |
| $19.0 \%$ | $7 x$ | $105 \%$ |
| $21.3 \%$ | $8 x$ | $120 \%$ |

Explanation: NA

| Last 10 Year Earnings Average (with zero growth) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate EPS |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & 4.0 \% \\ & \$ 2.20 \end{aligned}$ | $\underline{\text { https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA }}$ |  |  |  | Last Updated: | 1/3/19 |
| Constant PE (0\% perpetual growth) |  |  | 8.5 |  |  |  |  |  | 1/3/19 |
| Company's Perpetual Growth Rate |  |  | 0.0\% | https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS |  |  |  | Last Updated: |  |
| Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return |  |  | 2.4\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \$ 18.71 \\ 39 \% \end{gathered}$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |  |  |  |  |
| Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) |  |  | $\begin{gathered} \$ 31.74 \\ 66 \% \end{gathered}$ | DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV |  |  |  |  |  |
| 5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Zero Growth) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Perpetual Growth Rate |  |  | 0.0\% Explanation |  | Run at zero perpetual growth to be super conservative. |  |  |  |  |
| Morningstar Current Brokerage CF (TTM) |  |  | Discount Rate/WACC | PV of CFs |  | + Terminal Value | = PV |  |  |
|  |  | \$1.85 | 3.8\% | \$8.27 |  | \$49.21 | \$47.73 | 0.1\% |  |
|  |  | \$2.28 | 4.6\% | \$9.96 |  | \$49.47 | \$47.73 | 0.1\% |  |
|  |  |  | 4.2\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Explanation: NA |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows (Run Assuming Updated EPS (using 1/2 best case future annual estimate) \& DPS and Zero Growth) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Return On Share | eholder's Equity | 9.5\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Reta | ained To Equity | 9.5\% |  | 100\% |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | idends Percent | 0.0\% |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current and Projected Shareholder Equity and Projected Earnings |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Equity Base |  | EquityPS | Earnings | EarningsPS | Dividends |  | DivsPS | Added To Base | RetainedPS |
| 2018 | \$358,888,500 | \$23.05 | \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2019 | \$393,162,137 | \$25.25 | \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2020 | \$427,435,775 | \$27.45 | \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2021 | \$461,709,412 | \$29.65 | \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2022 | \$495,983,050 | \$31.86 | \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2023 | \$530,256,687 | \$34.06 | \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2024 | \$564,530,325 | \$36.26 | \$ \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2025 | \$598,803,962 | \$38.46 | \$ \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2026 | \$633,077,600 | \$40.66 | \$ \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2027 | \$667,351,237 | \$42.86 | \$34,273,637 |  | \$2.20 | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| 2028 | \$701,624,875 | \$45.06 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |  | \$0 | \$0.00 | \$34,273,637 | \$2.20 |
| NPV of future cashflows |  | \$218.17 | 1\% In Money |  |  | Last 10 Years Earnings |  |  |  |


| $\$ 108.33$ | 2\% In Money |
| ---: | ---: |
| $\$ 71.83$ | $3 \%$ In Money |
| $\$ 53.66$ | $4 \%$ In Money |
| $\$ 42.80$ | 5\% Too Expensive |
| $\$ 35.59$ | $6 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 30.47$ | 7\% Too Expensive |
| $\$ 26.64$ | 8\% Too Expensive |
| $\$ 23.68$ | $9 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 21.31$ | $10 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 19.38$ | $11 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 17.78$ | $12 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 16.42$ | $13 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 15.27$ | $14 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 14.26$ | $15 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 13.39$ | 16\% Too Expensive |
| $\$ 12.61$ | $17 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 11.93$ | $18 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 11.31$ | $19 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 10.76$ | $20 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 10.26$ | $21 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 9.80$ | $22 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 9.39$ | $23 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 9.01$ | $24 \%$ Too Expensive |
| $\$ 8.65$ | $25 \%$ Too Expensive |


| Year | EPS | Earnings | Shares Out <br> 2008 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $\$ 0.77$ | $\$ 10,000,000$ | $13,000,000$ |  |
| 2009 | $\$ 0.50$ | $\$ 7,000,000$ | $14,000,000$ |
| 2010 | $\$ 0.57$ | $\$ 8,000,000$ | $14,000,000$ |
| 2011 | $\$ 0.64$ | $\$ 9,000,000$ | $14,000,000$ |
| 2012 | $\$ 1.64$ | $\$ 23,000,000$ | $14,000,000$ |
| 2013 | $\$ 2.86$ | $\$ 40,000,000$ | $14,000,000$ |
| 2014 | $\$ 2.14$ | $\$ 30,000,000$ | $14,000,000$ |
| 2015 | $\$ 2.40$ | $\$ 36,000,000$ | $15,000,000$ |
| 2016 | $\$ 4.38$ | $\$ 70,000,000$ | $16,000,000$ |
| 2017 | $\$ 4.50$ | $\$ 72,000,000$ | $16,000,000$ |
| 2018 | $\$ 3.81$ | $\$ 61,000,000$ | $16,000,000$ |
| Average EPS | $\$ 2.20$ |  |  |

Explanation: NA


Explanation: NA

| Expected Return -5 Year DCF | $4.2 \%$ |
| ---: | :---: |
| Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows | $4.0 \%$ |
| Expected Return Total | $4.1 \%$ |
|  |  |
| Certainty Rating | $29 \%$ |

## Test \#2 - Best Case (with expected growth)

Expected Return - 5 Year DCF $4.2 \%$
Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows $5.0 \%$
Expected Return Total 4.6\%
Certainty Rating 38\%
Test \#2 - Stress Test (50\% Reduction In Expected Case)
15\% Weighting
Expected Return - 5 Year DCF 4.2\%
Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows $2.0 \%$
Expected Return Total 3.1\%
Certainty Rating 16\%
Test \#2 - Last 10 Year Earnings Average (with zero growth)

| Expected Return - 5 Year DCF | $4.2 \%$ |
| ---: | :--- |
| Expected Return -10 NPV Cash Flows | $4.0 \%$ |
| Expected Return Total | $4.1 \%$ |
|  |  |
| Certainty Rating | $30 \%$ |


| Consolidation Of All Scenarios (Weighted) |
| ---: |
| Expected Return - 5 Year DCF |
| Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows |
| Expected Return Total |
| Certainty Rating |
| 2.2\% |
| $2.9 \%$ |

Growing Sales \& Growing Earnings - Earnings and Sales are 1) Consistent, 2) Strong, and 3) Growing At A Steady Rate.


Explanation: Generally up over time but down pretty sharply from 2017 peak.


Explanation: Ditto but earnings have not fallen off as much as sales have so far.


Explanation: Ditto.


Explanation: Ditto.


| Year | Operating Margin |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | $\$ 15,000,000$ | $7 \%$ |  |  |
| 2009 | $\$ 9,000,000$ | $4 \%$ |  |  |
| 2010 | $\$ 17,000,000$ | $9 \%$ |  |  |
| 2011 | $\$ 12,000,000$ | $8 \%$ |  |  |
| 2012 | $\$ 36,000,000$ | $13 \%$ |  |  |
| 2013 | $\$ 66,000,000$ | $29 \%$ |  |  |
| 2014 | $\$ 64,000,000$ | $17 \%$ |  |  |
| 2015 | $\$ 74,000,000$ | $18 \%$ |  |  |
| 2016 | $\$ 114,000,000$ | $17 \%$ |  |  |
| 2017 | $\$ 108,000,000$ | $12 \%$ |  |  |
| 2018 | $\$ 53,000,000$ | $9 \%$ |  |  |
| Average: |  |  |  | $13 \%$ |
|  | High: | $29 \%$ |  |  |
| Low: | $4 \%$ |  |  |  |
|  | Certainty Rating: | $70 \%$ |  |  |



Explanation: Following gross margins

| Year | Cap Ex |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2008 | $\$ 0$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2009 | $\$ 0$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2010 | $\$ 0$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2011 | $\$ 2,000,000$ | $1 \%$ |
| 2012 | $\$ 7,000,000$ | $3 \%$ |
| 2013 | $\$ 1,000,000$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2014 | $\$ 3,000,000$ | $1 \%$ |
| 2015 | $\$ 3,000,000$ | $1 \%$ |
| 2016 | $\$ 3,000,000$ | $0 \%$ |
| 2017 | $\$ 5,000,000$ | $1 \%$ |
| 2018 | $\$ 8,000,000$ | $1 \%$ |
| Average: |  |  |
|  | High: | $1 \%$ |
|  | Low: | $0 \%$ |
|  | Certainty Rating: | $100 \%$ |



Explanation: Their Cap Ex is neglible.

Free Cash Flow - Is 1) Consistent, 2) Strong, and 3) Growing At A Steady Rate.


Explanation: Again, construction business doesn't really generate free cash flow...it is just money in, money out.


Explanation: No debt, ever.


Explanation: Not a bad payout ratio.

## Shares Outstanding / Buyback Program



| Year | Shares Out |
| :--- | :--- |
| 2008 | $13,000,000$ |
| 2009 | $14,000,000$ |
| 2010 | $14,000,000$ |
| 2011 | $14,000,000$ |
| 2012 | $14,000,000$ |
| 2013 | $14,000,000$ |
| 2014 | $14,000,000$ |
| 2015 | $15,000,000$ |
| 2016 | $16,000,000$ |
| 2017 | $16,000,000$ |
| 2018 | $16,000,000$ |

Explanation: No buyback plan...but shares outstanding have risen slightly over time.

## Insider Ownership / Activity



Explanation: Director has been buying from $\$ 60$ on down. Insiders own a very decent amount.

## Return "Moat" Assessment - Not A "Low Return" Business. Charlie Munger says that eventually over time returns will match ROIC.

| Return on Invested Capital |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Year |  |
| 2008 | $15.2 \%$ |
| 2009 | $8.3 \%$ |
| 2010 | $8.3 \%$ |
| 2011 | $9.3 \%$ |
| 2012 | $20.9 \%$ |
| 2013 | $29.0 \%$ |
| 2014 | $17.8 \%$ |
| 2015 | $18.0 \%$ |
| 2016 | $27.6 \%$ |
| 2017 | $22.2 \%$ |
| 2018 | $16.4 \%$ |


| Company (10 Year Average) | $17.5 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Company (10 Year High) | $29.0 \%$ |
| Company (10 Year Low) | $8.3 \%$ |
| Company (Current Year/TTM) | $16.4 \%$ |
|  |  |
| Industry (Current Year) | $21.3 \%$ |
| Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year) | $14.1 \%$ |

Explanation: Using Engineering/Construction


| Return on Assets |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Year |  |
| 2008 | $7.1 \%$ |
| 2009 | $5.5 \%$ |
| 2010 | $6.2 \%$ |
| 2011 | $5.5 \%$ |
| 2012 | $10.6 \%$ |
| 2013 | $14.4 \%$ |
| 2014 | $8.5 \%$ |
| 2015 | $9.1 \%$ |
| 2016 | $13.3 \%$ |
| 2017 | $11.5 \%$ |
| 2018 | $10.7 \%$ |


| Company (10 Year Average) | $9.3 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Company (10 Year High) | $14.4 \%$ |
| Company (10 Year Low) | $5.5 \%$ |
| Company (Current Year/TTM) | $10.7 \%$ |
|  |  |
| Industry (Current Year) | $3.4 \%$ |
| Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year) | $4.4 \%$ |

Explanation: NA
$\begin{array}{ll}\text { Yes } & \text { Is the ROA equal to or higher than the overall market? } \\ \text { Yes } & \text { Is the ROA equal to or higher than the industry? } \\ \text { Yes } & \text { Has the ROA always been positive? } \\ \text { Yes } & \text { Is the ROA steady (not really far from average, or high/low)? }\end{array}$

| Asset Turnover |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Year |  |
| 2008 | 1.57 |
| 2009 | 1.82 |
| 2010 | 1.45 |
| 2011 | 0.84 |
| 2012 | 1.27 |
| 2013 | 0.82 |
| 2014 | 1.07 |
| 2015 | 1.03 |
| 2016 | 1.28 |
| 2017 | 1.43 |
| 2018 | 0.99 |


| Company (10 Year Average) | 1.23 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Company (10 Year High) | 1.82 |
| Company (10 Year Low) | 0.82 |
| Company (Current Year/TTM) | 0.99 |

Explanation: NA

Yes Is the Asset Turnover consistent over time?
No Is the Asset Turnover improving (trending higher)?

| Net Margin \% |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Year |  |
| 2008 | $4.5 \%$ |
| 2009 | $3.0 \%$ |
| 2010 | $4.3 \%$ |
| 2011 | $6.5 \%$ |
| 2012 | $8.4 \%$ |
| 2013 | $17.6 \%$ |
| 2014 | $8.0 \%$ |
| 2015 | $8.8 \%$ |
| 2016 | $10.4 \%$ |
| 2017 | $8.1 \%$ |
| 2018 | $10.9 \%$ |


| Company (10 Year Average) | $8.2 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Company (10 Year High) | $17.6 \%$ |
| Company (10 Year Low) | $3.0 \%$ |
| Company (Current Year/TTM) | $10.9 \%$ |
| Industry (Current Year) | $0.2 \%$ |
| Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year) | $9.5 \%$ |
| Explanation: NA |  |


| Yes | Is the Net Margin \% equal to or higher than the overall market? |
| :--- | :--- |
| Yes | Is the Net Margin \% equal to or higher than the industry? |
| Yes | Has the Net Margin \% always been positive? |
| Yes | Is the Net Margin \% steady (not really far from average, or high/low)? |


| Gross Margin \% |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Year |  |
| 2008 | $14.9 \%$ |
| 2009 | $10.1 \%$ |
| 2010 | $15.9 \%$ |
| 2011 | $16.3 \%$ |
| 2012 | $18.0 \%$ |
| 2013 | $34.7 \%$ |
| 2014 | $21.8 \%$ |
| 2015 | $24.1 \%$ |
| 2016 | $21.7 \%$ |
| 2017 | $16.7 \%$ |
| 2018 | $17.0 \%$ |


| Company (10 Year Average) | $19.2 \%$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| Company (10 Year High) | $34.7 \%$ |
| Company (10 Year Low) | $10.1 \%$ |
| Company (Current Year/TTM) | $17.0 \%$ |

Explanation: NA

| Yes | Has the Gross Margin \% always been positive? |
| :--- | :--- |
| No | Is the Gross Margin \% generally improving? |
| Yes | Is the Gross Margin \% steady (not really far from average, or high/low)? |


| Operating Margin \% |  |
| :--- | :--- |
| Year |  |
| 2008 | $6.8 \%$ |
| 2009 | $3.9 \%$ |
| 2010 | $9.3 \%$ |
| 2011 | $8.5 \%$ |
| 2012 | $12.9 \%$ |
| 2013 | $29.1 \%$ |
| 2014 | $16.7 \%$ |
| 2015 | $17.9 \%$ |
| 2016 | $16.9 \%$ |
| 2017 | $12.1 \%$ |
| 2018 | $9.4 \%$ |


| Company (10 Year Average) | $13.0 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Company (10 Year High) | $29.1 \%$ |
| Company (10 Year Low) | $3.9 \%$ |
| Company (Current Year/TTM) | $9.4 \%$ |
| Industry (Current Year) | $21.3 \%$ |
| Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year) | $14.1 \%$ |

Explanation: NA

No Is the Operating Margin \% equal to or higher than the overall market?
No Is the Operating Margin \% equal to or higher than the industry?
Yes Has the Operating Margin \% always been positive?
No Is the Operating Margin \% generally improving?
No Is the Operating Margin \% steady (not really far from average, or high/low)?

No Is The Business Unique? Or Does It Have Something That Makes It Unique?
Don't Know Price Is Not The Single Most Important Motivating Factor In Purchase Of Product.
Yes Prices Can Be Adjusted For Inflation?
Yes Is Revenue "Safe" (Long-Term Contracts, Long-Term Retention, Don't Have To Resell Everything Every Time)?
Yes Does The Company Have Strong/Recognized Brands?
Yes Is There An Attachment To The Companies Brand(s)? Is There An Identifiable Consumer Monopoly?

| Competition "Moat" Assessment - Not A "Commodity-Type" Business |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| No |  | Is Business Competition Free? There Is Not A Company That Directly Competes With This One. |
| No |  |  | Is Business Competition Free? There Is Not A Presence Of Multiple Producers In Industry?

Explanation: It isn't hard to start a company like this...anyone with a truck and a toolbox...but it is hard to be of scale and competent.

| Financial Leverage <br> (Asset To Equity Ratio) |  |
| :---: | :---: |
| Year |  |
| 2008 | 1.71 |
| 2009 | 1.36 |
| 2010 | 1.34 |
| 2011 | 2.03 |
| 2012 | 1.94 |
| 2013 | 2.07 |
| 2014 | 2.11 |
| 2015 | 1.88 |
| 2016 | 2.21 |
| 2017 | 1.69 |
| 2018 | 1.25 |


| Company (10 Year Average) | 1.78 |
| :--- | :--- |
| Company (10 Year High) | 2.21 |
| Company (10 Year Low) | 1.25 |
| Company (Current Year/TTM) | 1.25 |

Explanation: NA

| Yes | Is the Financial Leverage consistent over time? |
| :--- | :--- |
| Yes | Is the Financial Leverage improving (ie lowering)? |


| Debt To Equity |  | Shares | Company (10 Year Average) | 0.0\% |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Year |  |  | Company (10 Year High) | 0.0\% |
| 2008 | 0\% | 13,000,000 | Company (10 Year Low) | 0.0\% |
| 2009 | 0\% | 14,000,000 | Company (Current Year/TTM) | 0.0\% |
| 2010 | 0\% | 14,000,000 |  |  |
| 2011 | 0\% | 14,000,000 | Industry (Current Year) | 62.0\% |
| 2012 | 0\% | 14,000,000 |  |  |
| 2013 | 0\% | 14,000,000 | Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year) | 119.0\% |
| 2014 | 0\% | 14,000,000 |  |  |
| 2015 | 0\% | 15,000,000 | Explanation: NA |  |
| 2016 | 0\% | 16,000,000 |  |  |
| 2017 | 0\% | 16,000,000 |  |  |
| 2018 | 0\% | 16,000,000 |  |  |


| Yes | Is The Debt To Equity Low Versus Static Measure (Less Than 50\%)? |
| :--- | :--- |
| Yes | Is The Debt To Equity Low Versus Market (Less Than Market)? |
| Yes | Is The Debt To Equity Low Versus Industry (Less Than Industry)? |
| Yes | Has The Debt To Equity Lowered Over Time? |
| Yes | The Company Is Not Adding Debt In Order To Increase ROE. |
| Yes | The Company Is Not Adding Debt In Order To Do Share Buybacks. |


| Compounding Assessment - Is The Company A (Or Going To Continue To Be A) Compounder? |  |
| :---: | :--- |
| Yes | Does The Company Retain Its Earnings (Ideally No Payouts Unless There Is No Additional Expansion Opportunity)? |
| Yes | Is The Company Able To Spend Little On Maintaining Current Operations (Is CapEx Rebuilding Or Expansion)? |
| Yes | Is Company Reinvesting Earnings In New Businesses, Expansion Of Existing Businesses (That Will Increase Value)? |
| No | Is Company Reinvesting Earnings In Share Repurchases (That Will Increase Value)? |

## Management Assessment - Does The Company's Management Add Value To The Business? <br> Yes Management Has Candor And Can Admit Mistakes <br> Yes Management Has Been In Place For Some Time <br> Yes Management Does What It Says It Will Do <br> Yes <br> Management Knows The Business (Rarely Surprised) <br> Yes <br> Management Is Allocating Capital (Reinvested Earnings) Into Businesses, Expansion That Will Increase Value. <br> Profitability Is Not Almost Entirely Dependent Upon Management's Abilities To Efficiently Utilize Tangible Assets (Idiot Run Test).

Yes

## Test \#8-MY GUT



## Point And Figure



Weekly Candlestick

## Certainty Rating: <br> 100\%

Explanation: Recent news about the additions to backlog have moved this stock into a new range (so fundamentals versus just price movement). This happened very recently (in early February)


## 50/200 Day Trend Line (Crossing?)

Certainty Rating: 100\%

Explanation: Hasn't turned yet but no longer widening.

## RSI (Cheap, Falling Knife?)

Certainty Rating: 100\%

Explanation: Rebounding from lows.

## MACD (Crossing?)

Certainty Rating: $100 \%$
Explanation: This has returned to trending back up.
Money Flow (Oversold?)
Certainty Rating: 100\%
Explanation: Recently got a bit overbought (but it was news based). Upmove now is not overbought.

