Ticker: ARLP Current Price: \$19.07 Prepared By MyMoneyTrainer On: 2/21/19

Name: Alliance Resource Partners LP Shares Outstanding 130,200,000 Industry: Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels Market Cap \$2,482,914,000

Write Up

I purchased this stock back in November 2017 @ \$18.35. These are my thoughts after reviewing this when I completed my initial purchase in 2017:

PRO #1 - First coal based MLP (formed in 1999). 2nd largest coal producer in the country. 1.8 b tons in reserves 37 m tons sold in 2016 (49 years available).

PRO #2 - I love the annual reports talk about 'long haul'.

PRO #3 - Workforce is union free.

PRO #4 - Low debt and much lower debt to equity over 10-year period (lowest in most recent quarter). They spent downturn of 2016 bolstering the balance sheet (including lowering payouts).

PRO #5 - MLP eliminates double taxation.

CON #1 - Coal is out of fashion...but there is no way we don't wind up figuring out how to burn this stuff without polluting. FACT!

CON #2 - Only 4 analysts follow them.

CON #3 - I'm not actually excited about owning an MLP...I guess. This is a MLP (no corporate income tax). I researched owning these in my ROTH. It will seemingly trigger the UBTI/UBIT tax rules (which I do not want to get into). Need to own this in my taxable account (if at all). Income (distributions/dividends) will be treated as income for me upon tax time.

CON #4 - Tax reform in Senate right now might impact creation of new MLPs (not impact existing ones).

So, one of the biggest things that looks different for this business is the large increase in shares outstanding. What the heck happened?!?! Was I diluted? This is a restructuring in the corporate structure. The 2017 annual report says: "The Alliance Partnerships also took the first step toward simplifying our structure through an Exchange Transaction. The Exchange Transaction eliminated AHGP's incentive distribution rights and converted its general partner interest in exchange for the issuance of 56,100,000 ARLP common units. Completed in July, it further enhanced our capital markets capacity and access. We are also moving forward to complete the process of fully simplifying the Alliance Partnership structure, which will result in ARLP being the only publicly traded reporting entity". So this is related to the sister company AHGP - Alliance Holdings GP, L.P. They are merging these two entities into ARLP. This should not be dilutive overall. Honestly, I don't claim to understand why they had the two entities to begin with and how the merging really impacts my position in ARLP overall. My take is it is not a big deal but I could be completely wrong on this.

These guys think like owners...long term owners...because they are. Insiders have 21% ownership and insiders are still buying (with Directors buying in \$19.55-\$19.85 late last year). When I read the annual reports and see the language they use and match that up with their ownership I know these guys are going to run the company to their benefit. I really like this aspect of this business...A LOT!

My one major sticking point with this entire investment is just the fact that it is coal production. Coal is a dirty fuel, a declining industry, and a huge target for all the upcoming green energy investment. It could also be on the wrong side of legislation/legislatures who want to make people using coal pay extra for using it (which could have an impact on pricing and demand). I don't view either of these risks as being outside the realm of possibility as the whims of governments can change based on who is in elected power. Currently there is not too much bad on this front worldwide (other than generally the world is moving away from coal usage) but this could change and impact the company greatly. All that said, I don't think we stop using coal anytime soon (maybe ever) and there will be a need for the country's second largest coal producer to continue to produce (and to use up their 49 years of available supply).

In general, I like this company and will likely add to my position in it a bit at this time based on this updated analysis. I don't really find too much wrong with this investment and the things I look at show a high degree of certainty. I've been reinvesting the dividends since I purchased this. With the really high yield associated with this that has not been insignificant. I think going forward I will up my investment to be in line with my target allocation and then no longer reinvest the dividends and just let those flow into my account. At the current rate the investment will pay for itself in a few years (and hopefully I'll then have the original investment plus some extra capital to invest elsewhere). I might also just keep reinvesting too since I think the value is right and I like the company. Hmmm! Not sure yet!

I'm sharing my analysis here. If you have thoughts on it I'd love to hear them hit me up on Twitter @mymoneytrainer

Certainty Rating						
Test #0 - SUPER QUICK VALUATION	118%					
Estimated 'Intrinsic Value' Between: Expected Return:	Between \$20.49 (10 17.7%	7% of current price) a	and \$34.75 (182% of	current pr	ice)	
Test #1 - SCREEN SELECTION	73%					
Valuation Score	20.05	81%	Quality Score	18.60	65%	
Test #2 - INDUSTRY METRICS COMPARE	85%					
Average:	85%					
Test #3 - PRICE HISTORY COMPARE	83%					
Price/Earnings: 85%	Price/Sales:	70%	Price/Free CF:	75%	Price/Book:	100%
Test #4 - VALUATION SCENARIOS	106%					
Best Case - Expected Return: Stress Test - Expected Return:	18.2% 14.7%		r Average - Expected Combined - Expected		21.7% 16.9%	
Test #5 - FINANCIALS REVEW	89%					
Sales Growth: Earnings Growth: Sales Per Share Growth: Earnings Per Share Growth:	85% 90% 90% 90%	Gross Profit: Operating Margin: Cap Ex: Free Cash Flow:	75% 75% 80% 100%	Divide	Debt To Equity: end Sustainability:	100% 100%
Test #6 - BUYING / OWNERSHIP	100%					
Shares Outstanding / Buyback Program:	100%		Insider Ownership	Activity:	100%	
Test #7 - GOOD BUSINESS CHECK	88%					
Return "Moat" Assessment: Business "Moat" Assessment: Competition "Moat" Assessment:	93% 72% 60%		Leverage Asse Compounding Asse Management Asse	essment:	100% 100% 100%	
Test #8 - MY GUT	100%					
Other's Analysis: 100%	PROS: CONS:	100% 100%	Moat	_	nent Assessment: tion Assessment:	100% 60%
Test #9 - TECHNICALS / TIMING	100%					
Point & Figure:	100%	50/200 Day: RSI:	100% 100%		MACD: Money Flow:	100% 100%
			.0075		,	.0075

Test #0 - SUPER QUICK VALUATION - Expected Case - Based On 1) NPV Earnings, 2) 5 Year DCF Free Cash Flow, 3) 10 Year NPV Cash Flow.

Tells Us Quickly If It Makes Sense To Even Dive Deeper (No Sense In Investing Unless Margin Of Safety Exists And Likelihood Of Decent Returns Is High).

Multiples Of RFRR Are Good (Meaing This Model Kicks Out Higher Certainty Ratings For Higher Multiples).

Net Present Value Calculator (AKA Ben Graham Formula) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate EPS	4.0% \$2.41	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA	Last Updated:	1/3/19
Constant PE (0% perpetual growth)	8.5			
Company's Perpetual Growth Rate	0.0%			
Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return	2.4%	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS	Last Updated:	1/3/19
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)	\$20.49			
% of Current Price	107%	BUY - Current Price Is Below IV		
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) % of Current Price	\$34.75 182%	BUY - Current Price Is Below IV		

5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

Perpetual Growth Rate 0.0% Explanation: Run at zero perpetual growth to be super conservative.

	D	iscount Rate/WACC	PV of CFs	+ Terminal Value	= PV	
Last 3 Year Average:	\$5.69	28.0%	\$14.40	\$20.32	\$19.02	0.3%
Last 10 Year Average:	\$3.84	18.7%	\$11.81	\$20.51	\$19.14	-0.4%
		23.4%				

Year	FCFPS
2008	\$0.75
2009	-\$0.62
2010	\$3.14
2011	\$3.89
2012	\$1.78
2013	\$4.60
2014	\$5.68
2015	\$5.90
2016	\$7.20
2017	\$6.37
2018	\$3.49

TTM FCF: \$455,000,000

Explanation: The number of shares outstanding has changed from 74mmish to 131mmish. This obviously diluted the FCFPS in 2018.

10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows (Run Assuming Updated EPS (using most likely future annual estimate) & DPS and Zero Growth)

Return On Shareholder's Equity	29.5%	
Retained To Equity	4.2%	14%
Dividends Percent	25.3%	

Current and Pro	jected Shareholder	Equity and Pr	oiected Earnings

Juli Cill ai	ia i rojectea oriarenoi	der Equity and i	rojected Larrings					
	Equity Base	EquityPS	Earnings	EarningsPS	Dividends		Added To Base	RetainedPS
2018	\$1,063,734,000	\$8.17	\$313,782,000	\$2.4	1 \$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$44,268,000	\$0.34
2019	\$1,108,002,000	\$8.51	\$313,782,000	\$2.4	1 \$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$44,268,000	\$0.34
2020	\$1,152,270,000	\$8.85	\$313,782,000	\$2.4	1 \$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$44,268,000	\$0.34
2021								\$0.34
2022								\$0.34
2023								\$0.34
2024								\$0.34
2025								\$0.34
2026								\$0.34
2027								\$0.34
2028	\$1,506,414,000) \$11.57	\$313,782,000	\$2.4	1 \$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$44,268,000	\$0.34
NI	PV of future cashflows	\$238.86	1%	In Money	EPS Estimates	Avg	Low	High
		\$118.60	2%	In Money	Consensus 19 (#4)	\$2.92	\$2.78	\$3.03
		\$78.64	3%	In Money	Consensus 20 (#4)	\$2.61	\$2.41	\$2.78
		\$58.74	4%	In Money				
		\$46.86		In Money				
		\$38.97		In Money				
		\$33.36		In Money	-			
		\$29.17		In Money	Average	\$2.77	\$2.60	\$2.91
		\$25.92		In Money				
		\$23.33		In Money	Explanation:		ginal analysis I used	\$2.14 as my
		\$21.22		In Money		forward e	earning estimate.	
		\$19.46		In Money				
		\$17.98		Too Expensive			ent low estimate from	•
		\$16.71		Too Expensive			is \$2.41 for 2020. I	'll use that for this
		\$15.62		Too Expensive		analysis.		
		\$14.66		Too Expensive				
		\$13.81		Too Expensive				
		\$13.06		Too Expensive				
		\$12.39		Too Expensive				
		\$11.78		Too Expensive				
		\$11.23		Too Expensive				
		\$10.73		Too Expensive				
		\$10.28		Too Expensive				
		\$9.86		Too Expensive				
		\$9.47	25%	Too Expensive				

Expected Return - 5 Year DCF	23.4%
Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows	12%
Expected Return Average	17.7%

	Certainty Rating
107%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)
182%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula)
120%	5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow
75%	10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows
105%	Average
118%	Total

Explanation: NA

Hurdle Returns (vs. Risk Free)				
2.4%	0x	0%		
4.7%	1x	15%		
7.1%	2x	30%		
9.5%	3x	45%		
11.9%	4x	60%		
14.2%	5x	75%		
16.6%	6x	90%		
19.0%	7x	105%		
21.3%	8x	120%		

Test #1 - SCREEN SELECTION - Expect Investment To Score Highly On Both Valuation AND Quality Criteria.

Tells Us Quickly If It Makes Sense To Even Dive Deeper (No Sense In Investing Unless Margin Of Safety Exists And Likelihood Of Decent Returns Is High).

Valuation Occurs	on (Mars Bassible Cooks Of Of)		
valuation Scoring	ng (Max Possible Score 25.25)	5.00	Base (+5) – PE (FYF) vs. Market PE
		5.00	Base (+5) – PE (FYF) vs. Market PE Base (+5) – PE (FYF) vs. Industry
20.05	Total Valuation Score	5.00	Base (+5) – PE (FYF) vs. Industry Base (+5) – PE (FYF) vs. Static Hurdle (Case Shiller Mean)
20.05 79%	Percent of Max Possible Score	1.00	Extra Credit (+1) – PE (TTM) vs. Market PE
			, , , ,
82%	Percent of Current Universe	1.00	Extra Credit (+1) – PE (MRFY) vs. Market PE
81%	Combined	0.40	Extra Credit (+1) – Sales (TTM) vs. Industry
		1.00	Extra Credit (+1) – CF (MRFY) vs. Industry
		1.00	Extra Credit (+1) – CF (MRFY) vs. Market
O a utai	ata Datina	0.40	Extra Credit (+1) – BV (MRQ) vs. Industry
	nty Rating	0.00	Extra Credit (+2) – PEG (TTM) vs. Market
Valuat		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – Schwab
	ality: 65%	0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – Morningstar
Combir	ned: 73%	0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – Credit Suisse
		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – Ned Davis
		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – S&P Cap IQ Earnings and Div Rank
		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – S&P CFRA
		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – Argus
		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – Market Edge
		0.25	Extra Credit (+.25) – Analyst – Reuters
Quality Scoring	(Max Possible Score 26.50)		
	•	1.00	Base (+1) – Positive PE (FYF)
		1.00	Base (+1) – Positive Net Profit Margin
18.60	Total Quality Score	1.00	Base (+1) – Positive Price To Cash Flow
70%	Percent of Max Possible Score	1.00	Base (+1) – Positive Cash Flow Per Share
60%	Percent of Current Universe	1.00	Base (+1) – Positive ROE
65%	Combined	1.00	Base (+1) – Positive ROI
		0.00	Base (+1) – Quick Ratio Greater Than Static Hurdle
Explanat	tion: Valuation scores are lower	0.00	Base (+1) – Quick Ratio Higher Than Industry
	because there is no analyst	1.10	Base (+1) – Current Ratio Greater Than Static Hurdle
	coverage available.	0.00	Base (+1) – Current Ratio Higher Than Industry
		1.00	Base (+5) – Debt To Equity Lower Than Static Hurdle
		5.00	Base (+5) – Debt To Equity Lower Than Industry
		1.50	Base (+1) – Net Profit Margin Higher Than Industry
		0.00	Base (+1) – Industry ROE vs. Market ROE
		1.50	Base (+1) – ROE vs. Industry
		0.00	Base (+1) – Industry ROI vs. Market ROI
		1.50	Base (+1) – ROI vs. Industry
		1.00	Base (+1) – Market Cap
		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25%) – Morningstar Moat
		0.00	Extra Credit (+.25%) – Morningstar Stewardship

Test #2 - INDUSTRY METRICS COMPARE - Is it a good deal compared to other companies in the industry?

Compare a variety of financial valuation metrics of the company against the other companies in its industry to ensure a margin of safety.

Industry: Oil, Gas & Consumable Fuels

Number of Companies In Industry: 97

	Industry	Stock		
Average Price/Earnings (FYF):	20.2	5.5	Better	100%
Average Price/Earnings (TTM):	19.9	5.9	Better	100%
Average Price/Earnings (MRFY):	28.3	6.1	Better	100%
Average Price/Book (MRQ):	2.5	1.8	Better	100%
Average Price/Sales (TTM):	1.7	1.2	Better	100%
Average Price/Cash Flow (MRFY):	9.2	4.1	Better	100%
Average PEG (TTM):	4.3	NA		
Average Debt To Equity (MRQ):	168.0%	34.0%	Better	100%
Average Net Profit Margin (MRFY):	5.0%	16.9%	Better	100%
Average Return On Equity (TTM):	7.1%	32.6%	Better	100%
Average Return On Assets (MRFY):	2.7%	17.7%	Better	100%
Average Quick Ratio (MRQ):	1.3	0.9	Worse	0%
Average Current Ratio (MRQ):	1.3	1.1	Worse	0%
Average Cash Flow Per Share (TTM):	\$4.99	\$5.09	Better	100%


Average (Certainty Rating): 85%

Explanation: NA

Test #3 - PRICE HISTORY COMPARE - Is it a good deal based on its own history? "Price is what you pay, value is what you get!"

Compare a variety of financial valuation metrics of the company against the historical prices of the company to ensure a margin of safety.

		Historical Pricing	g			Max Price N	Novements
Year	High Price	Low Price	Volume	Shares Out	1	Drawdown	Gain
2008	\$29.00	\$8.70	244,192	73,000,000	0%	70%	233%
2009	\$22.50	\$11.94	200,427	73,000,000	0%	47%	88%
2010	\$33.06	\$18.76	211,629	73,000,000	0%	43%	76%
2011	\$42.05	\$29.00	196,169	74,000,000	0%	31%	45%
2012	\$41.90	\$25.21	217,088	74,000,000	0%	40%	66%
2013	\$39.50	\$29.03	135,316	74,000,000	0%	27%	36%
2014	\$53.84	\$37.08	174,963	74,000,000	0%	31%	45%
2015	\$43.65	\$11.93	285,960	74,000,000	0%	73%	266%
2016	\$26.65	\$9.95	335,638	74,000,000	0%	63%	168%
2017	\$25.55	\$17.60	302,850	99,000,000	0%	31%	45%
2018	\$21.90	\$15.55	446,845	131,000,000	0%	29%	41%
Average:	\$34.51	\$19.52				43%	77%
Max:	\$53.84	\$37.08				31%	45%
Min:	\$21.90	\$8.70				60%	152%
AT High vs. AT Low:	\$53.84	\$8.70				84%	519%



Explanation: NA

Price To Earnings Over Time

Price to Earnings Over Time							
Year	EPS	Earnings	High PE	Low PE			
2008	\$1.84	\$134,000,000	15.8	4.7			
2009	\$2.63	\$192,000,000	8.6	4.5			
2010	\$4.40	\$321,000,000	7.5	4.3			
2011	\$5.26	\$389,000,000	8.0	5.5			
2012	\$3.09	\$229,000,000	13.5	8.1			
2013	\$5.31	\$393,000,000	7.4	5.5			
2014	\$6.72	\$497,000,000	8.0	5.5			
2015	\$4.14	\$306,000,000	10.6	2.9			
2016	\$4.58	\$339,000,000	5.8	2.2			
2017	\$3.07	\$304,000,000	8.3	5.7			
2018	\$2.98	\$390,000,000	7.4	5.2			
Average:	\$4.00	\$317,636,364	9.2	4.9			
Max:	\$6.72	\$497,000,000	15.8	8.1			
Min:	\$1.84	\$134,000,000	5.8	2.2			

Certainty	85%
Rating	03 /0




Explanation: Currently at 6.4x which is closer to the average low of 4.9x than the average high of 9.2x.

Price To Sales Over Time

Price to Sales Over Time							
Year	SPS	Sales	High PS	Low PS			
2008	\$15.85	\$1,157,000,000	1.8	0.5			
2009	\$16.86	\$1,231,000,000	1.3	0.7			
2010	\$22.05	\$1,610,000,000	1.5	0.9			
2011	\$24.92	\$1,844,000,000	1.7	1.2			
2012	\$27.49	\$2,034,000,000	1.5	0.9			
2013	\$29.81	\$2,206,000,000	1.3	1.0			
2014	\$31.09	\$2,301,000,000	1.7	1.2			
2015	\$30.73	\$2,274,000,000	1.4	0.4			
2016	\$26.09	\$1,931,000,000	1.0	0.4			
2017	\$18.14	\$1,796,000,000	1.4	1.0			
2018	\$14.92	\$1,954,000,000	1.5	1.0			
Average:	\$23.45	\$1,848,909,091	1.5	0.8			
Max:	\$31.09	\$2,301,000,000	1.8	1.2			
Min:	\$14.92	\$1,157,000,000	1.0	0.4			

Certainty	70%
Rating	7070




Explanation: At 1.3x this is closer to the average high of 1.5x versus the average low of .8x.

Price To Book Over Time

Price to Book Over Time								
Year	BVPS	Book Value	High BVPS	Low BVPS				
2008								
2009	\$4.36	\$318,280,000	5.2	2.7				
2010	\$6.21	\$453,330,000	5.3	3.0				
2011	\$8.23	\$609,020,000	5.1	3.5				
2012	\$9.57	\$708,180,000	4.4	2.6				
2013	\$10.71	\$792,540,000	3.7	2.7				
2014	\$13.43	\$993,820,000	4.0	2.8				
2015	\$14.14	\$1,046,360,000	3.1	0.8				
2016	\$13.72	\$1,015,280,000	1.9	0.7				
2017	\$8.80	\$871,200,000	2.9	2.0				
2018	\$9.23	\$1,209,130,000	2.4	1.7				
Average:	\$9.84	\$801,714,000	3.8	2.3				
Max:	\$14.14	\$1,209,130,000	5.3	3.5				
Min:	\$4.36	\$318,280,000	1.9	0.7				






Explanation: At 2.0x it is currently trading below the average low of 2.3x (well below the average high of 3.8x).

Price To Free Cash Flow Over Time

Price to Free Cash Flow Over Time								
Year	FCFPS	Free Cash Flow	High FCFPS	Low FCFPS				
2008	\$0.75	\$55,000,000	38.5	11.5				
2009	-\$0.62	-\$45,260,000						
2010	\$3.14	\$229,220,000	10.5	6.0				
2011	\$3.89	\$287,860,000	10.8	7.5				
2012	\$1.78	\$131,720,000	23.5	14.2				
2013	\$4.60	\$340,400,000	8.6	6.3				
2014	\$5.68	\$420,320,000	9.5	6.5				
2015	\$5.90	\$436,600,000	7.4	2.0				
2016	\$7.20	\$532,800,000	3.7	1.4				
2017	\$6.37	\$630,630,000	4.0	2.8				
2018	\$3.49	\$457,795,699	6.3	4.4				
Average:	\$3.84	\$316,098,700	12.3	6.3				
Max:	\$7.20	\$630,630,000	38.5	14.2				
Min:	-\$0.62	-\$45,260,000	3.7	1.4				

Certainty Rating	75%	
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Explanation: At 6.3x it is trading right at the average low and about half the average high. Some of the older values are skewing the averages higher however. So low BUT not low.

Test #4 - VALUATION SCENARIOS - 1) Best Case, 2) Stress Test (50% Reduction In Expected) 3) Last 10 Year Earnings Average.

Since Valuation Models Can Be Made To Spit Out Any Result Anyone Wants We Make Sure To Run Several Convservative Scenarios. Multiples Of RFRR Are Good.

Best Case (with expected growth)

Net Present Value Calculator (AKA Ben Graham Formula) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate EPS	4.0% \$2.61	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA	Last Updated:	1/3/19
Constant PE (0% perpetual growth)	8.5			
Company's Perpetual Growth Rate	0.0%			
Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return	2.4%	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS	Last Updated:	1/3/19
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)	\$22.19			
% of Current Price	116%	BUY - Current Price Is Below IV		
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula)	\$37.63			
% of Current Price	197%	BUY - Current Price Is Below IV		

5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Expected Growth)

Perp	etual Growth Rate	0.0%	Explanation:	NA		
		Discount Rate/WACC	PV of CFs	+ Terminal Value	= PV	
Morningstar Curre	nt \$5.69	28.0%	\$14.40	\$20.32	\$19.02	0.3%
Brokerage CF (TT	M) \$3.84	18.7%	\$11.81	\$20.51	\$19.14	-0.4%
		23.4%				

Explanation: NA

10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows (Run Assuming Updated EPS (using best case future annual estimate) & DPS and Expected Growth)

Return On Shareholder's Equity 31.9% Retained To Equity 6.6% 21% **Dividends Percent** 25.3%

Current and Projected Shareholder Equity and Projected Earnings

	Equity Base	EquityPS	Earnings	EarningsPS		Dividends	DivsPS	Added To Base	RetainedPS
2018	8 \$1,063,734,000	\$8.17	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
2019	9 \$1,134,042,000	\$8.71	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
2020	0 \$1,204,350,000	\$9.25	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
202	1 \$1,274,658,000	\$9.79	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
2022	2 \$1,344,966,000	\$10.33	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
202	3 \$1,415,274,000	\$10.87	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
2024	4 \$1,485,582,000	\$11.41	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
202	5 \$1,555,890,000	\$11.95	\$339,822,000		\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54

2026	\$1,626,198,000	\$12.49	\$339,822,000	\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
2027	\$1,696,506,000	\$13.03	\$339,822,000	\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
2028	\$1,766,814,000	\$13.57	\$339,822,000	\$2.61	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$70,308,000	\$0.54
NPV	of future cashflows	\$258.68	1% I	n Money				
		\$128.44	2% I	n Money				
		\$85.17	3% I	n Money				
		\$63.62	4% I	n Money				
		\$50.75	5% I	n Money				
		\$42.20	6% I	n Money				
		\$36.13	7% I	n Money				
		\$31.59		n Money				
		\$28.07		n Money				
		\$25.27		n Money	Explanation:	Using the av	erage 2020 forcast	s (which is still a
		\$22.98		n Money	•	_	n the 2019 estimate	•
		\$21.08		n Money				,
		\$19.47		n Money				
		\$18.10		Too Expensive				
		\$16.91		Too Expensive				
		\$15.87		Too Expensive				
		\$14.96		Too Expensive				
		\$14.14		Too Expensive				
		\$13.41		Too Expensive				
		\$12.76		Too Expensive				
		\$12.16		Too Expensive				
		\$11.62		Too Expensive				
		\$11.13		Too Expensive				
		\$10.68		Too Expensive				
		\$10.26		Too Expensive				
	Expected Return -	5 Year DCF	23.4%					
Exp	ected Return - 10 NPV	Cash Flows	13%			Hui	rdle Returns (vs. Ri	sk Free)
	From a stand Day	4	40.00/			0.40/	0	00/

Expected Return Average 18.2%

	Certainty Rating
116%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)
197%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula)
120%	5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow
75%	10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows
105%	Average
123%	Total

Explanation: NA

Hurdle Returns (vs. Risk Free)					
2.4%	0x	0%			
4.7%	1x	15%			
7.1%	2x	30%			
9.5%	3x	45%			
11.9%	4x	60%			
14.2%	5x	75%			
16.6%	6x	90%			
19.0%	7x	105%			
21.3%	8x	120%			

Stress Test (50% Reduction In Expected) (with zero growth)

Net Present Value Calculator (AKA Ben Graham Formula) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate EPS	4.0% \$1.21	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA	Last Updated:	1/3/19
Constant PE (0% perpetual growth)	8.5			
Company's Perpetual Growth Rate	0.0%			
Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return	2.4%	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS	Last Updated:	1/3/19
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)	\$10.24			
% of Current Price	54%	DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV		
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula) % of Current Price	\$17.37 91%	DON'T BUY - Current Price is Above IV		

5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

Perpetual Growth Rate		0.0%	Explanation:	Run at zero perpetual growth to be super conservative.		
		Discount Rate/WACC	PV of CFs	+ Terminal Value	= PV	
Morningstar Current	\$5.69	28.0%	\$14.40	\$20.32	\$19.02	0.3%
Brokerage CF (TTM)	\$3.84	18.7% 23.4%	\$11.81	\$20.51	\$19.14	-0.4%

Explanation: The number of shares outstanding has changed from 74mmish to 131mmish. This obviously diluted the FCFPS in 2018.

-72%

10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows (Run Assuming Updated EPS (using 1/2 best case future annual estimate) & DPS and Zero Growth)

Return On Shareholder's Equity 14.7%
Retained To Equity -10.6%

Dividends Descept 25.2%

Dividends Percent 25.3%

Current and Projected Shareholder Equity and Projected Earnings

	Equity Base	EquityPS	Earnings	EarningsPS		Dividends	DivsPS	Added To Base	RetainedPS
2018	\$1,063,734,000	\$8.17	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2019	9 \$951,111,000	\$7.31	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2020	\$838,488,000	\$6.44	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2021	\$725,865,000	\$5.58	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2022	\$613,242,000	\$4.71	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2023	\$500,619,000	\$3.85	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2024	\$387,996,000	\$2.98	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2025	\$275,373,000	\$2.12	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2026	\$162,750,000	\$1.25	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2027	\$50,127,000	\$0.39	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87
2028	-\$62,496,000	-\$0.48	\$156,891,000		\$1.21	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	-\$112,623,000	-\$0.87

NPV of future cashflows	\$119.43	1% In Money
141 V OI Tutare casimows	\$59.30	2% In Money
	\$39.32	3% In Money
	\$29.37	4% In Money
	\$29.37 \$23.43	-
	•	5% In Money
	\$19.48	6% In Money
	\$16.68	7% Too Expensive
	\$14.58	8% Too Expensive
	\$12.96	9% Too Expensive
	\$11.67	10% Too Expensive
	\$10.61	11% Too Expensive
	\$9.73	12% Too Expensive
	\$8.99	13% Too Expensive
	\$8.36	14% Too Expensive
	\$7.81	15% Too Expensive
	\$7.33	16% Too Expensive
	\$6.91	17% Too Expensive
	\$6.53	18% Too Expensive
	\$6.19	19% Too Expensive
	\$5.89	20% Too Expensive
	\$5.62	21% Too Expensive
	\$5.37	22% Too Expensive
	\$5.14	23% Too Expensive
	\$4.93	24% Too Expensive
	\$4.74	25% Too Expensive
	ΨΤ.1 Τ	2070 TOO Expensive

Explanation: NA

Expected Return - 5 Year DCF 23.4%
Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows 6%
Expected Return Average 14.7%

_		
ı		Certainty Rating
ſ	54%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)
l	91%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula)
l	120%	5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow
l	30%	10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows
l	90%	Average
l	77%	Total

Explanation: NA

Hurdle Returns (vs. Risk Free)					
2.4%	0x	0%			
4.7%	1x	15%			
7.1%	2x	30%			
9.5%	3x	45%			
11.9%	4x	60%			
14.2%	5x	75%			
16.6%	6x	90%			
19.0%	7x	105%			
21.3%	8x	120%			

Last 10 Year Earnings Average (with zero growth)						
20-year AAA Corporate Bond Rate EPS	4.0% \$4.00	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA	Last Updated:	1/3/19		
Constant PE (0% perpetual growth)	8.5					
Company's Perpetual Growth Rate	0.0%					
Minimum Risk Free Rate of Return	2.4%	https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TB3MS	Last Updated:	1/3/19		
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)	\$34.00					
% of Current Price	178%	BUY - Current Price Is Below IV				
Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula)	\$57.68					
% of Current Price	302%	BUY - Current Price Is Below IV				

5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow (Owners Earnings) Calculator (AKA NPV) (Run Assuming Zero Growth)

Perpetual Growth Rate		0.0%	Explanation:	Run at zero perpetual growth to be super conservative.			
		Discount Rate/WACC	PV of CFs	+ Terminal Value	= PV		
Morningstar Current	\$5.69	28.0%	\$14.40	\$20.32	\$19.02	0.3%	
Brokerage CF (TTM)	\$3.84	18.7%	\$11.81	\$20.51	\$19.14	-0.4%	
		23.4%					

Explanation: The number of shares outstanding has changed from 74mmish to 131mmish. This obviously diluted the FCFPS in 2018.

10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows (Run Assuming Updated EPS (using 1/2 best case future annual estimate) & DPS and Zero Growth)

Return On Shareholder's Equity 49.0%
Retained To Equity 23.6% 48%
Dividends Percent 25.3%

Current and Projected Shareholder Equity and Projected Earnings

	Equity Base	EquityPS	Earnings	EarningsPS		Dividends	DivsPS	Added To Base	RetainedPS
2018	\$1,063,734,000	\$8.17	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2019	\$1,315,084,089	\$10.10	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2020	\$1,566,434,178	\$12.03	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2021	\$1,817,784,268	\$13.96	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2022	\$2,069,134,357	\$15.89	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2023	\$2,320,484,446	\$17.82	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2024	\$2,571,834,535	\$19.75	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2025	\$2,823,184,624	\$21.68	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2026	\$3,074,534,713	\$23.61	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2027	\$3,325,884,803	\$25.54	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93
2028	\$3,577,234,892	\$27.47	\$520,864,089		\$4.00	\$269,514,000	\$2.07	\$251,350,089	\$1.93

NPV of future cashflows \$396.50 1% In Money

Last 10 Years Earnings

\$196.87	2% In Money
\$130.54	3% In Money
\$97.51	4% In Money
\$77.78	5% In Money
\$64.69	6% In Money
\$55.37	7% In Money
\$48.42	8% In Money
\$43.03	9% In Money
\$38.73	10% In Money
\$35.22	11% In Money
\$32.31	12% In Money
\$29.85	13% In Money
\$27.74	14% In Money
\$25.92	15% In Money
\$24.33	16% In Money
\$22.92	17% In Money
\$21.68	18% In Money
\$20.56	19% In Money
\$19.55	20% In Money
\$18.64	21% Too Expensive
\$17.82	22% Too Expensive
\$17.06	23% Too Expensive
\$16.37	24% Too Expensive
\$15.73	25% Too Expensive

Expected Return - 5 Year DCF 23.4%
Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows 20%
Expected Return Average 21.7%

	Certainty Rating
178%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Original Formula)
302%	Graham's Intrinsic Value (Revised Formula)
120%	5 Year Discounted Free Cash Flow
120%	10 Year NPV of Future Cashflows
120%	Average
168%	Total

Explanation: NA

Year	EPS	Earnings	Shares Out
2008	\$1.84	\$134,000,000	73,000,000
2009	\$2.63	\$192,000,000	73,000,000
2010	\$4.40	\$321,000,000	73,000,000
2011	\$5.26	\$389,000,000	74,000,000
2012	\$3.09	\$229,000,000	74,000,000
2013	\$5.31	\$393,000,000	74,000,000
2014	\$6.72	\$497,000,000	74,000,000
2015	\$4.14	\$306,000,000	74,000,000
2016	\$4.58	\$339,000,000	74,000,000
2017	\$3.07	\$304,000,000	99,000,000
2018	\$2.98	\$390,000,000	131,000,000
Average EPS	\$4.00		

Explanation: This is skewed high due to the increased sharecount in recent years. I'm discounting this one out completely (as the prior EPS values are much higher than they would be today). Will double weight the stress test (since the worst case is some kind of legislation arrives that cripples the coal market).

	Hurdle Returns (vs. Risk Free)		
	2.4%	0x	0%
-	4.7%	1x	15%
-	7.1%	2x	30%
-	9.5%	3x	45%
-	11.9%	4x	60%
-	14.2%	5x	75%
-	16.6%	6x	90%
-	19.0%	7x	105%
	21.3%	8x	120%

Valuation	Scenarios :	Summarv
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Test #1 - Expected Case (with zero growth)		55% Weighting
Expected Return - 5 Year DCF Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows Expected Return Total	23.4% 12.0% 17.7%	
Certainty Rating	118%	
Test #2 - Best Case (with expected growth)		15% Weighting
Expected Return - 5 Year DCF Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows Expected Return Total	23.4% 13.0% 18.2%	
Certainty Rating	123%	
Test #2 - Stress Test (50% Reduction In Expected Case)		30% Weighting
Expected Return - 5 Year DCF Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows Expected Return Total	23.4% 6.0% 14.7%	
Certainty Rating	77%	
Test #2 - Last 10 Year Earnings Average (with zero growth)		0% Weighting
Expected Return - 5 Year DCF Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows Expected Return Total Certainty Rating	23.4% 20.0% 21.7% 168%	
Consolidation Of All Scenarios (Weighted)		
Expected Return - 5 Year DCF Expected Return - 10 NPV Cash Flows Expected Return Total	23.4% 10.4% 16.9%	
Certainty Rating	106%	

Test #5 - FINANCIALS REVEW - Review Of 10 Year Financial Trends For Key Metrics

Tells Us The Business Has Pricing Power, History Of Success, Growth, Rate Of Growth, And Our Initial Rate Of Return.

Growing Sales & Growing Earnings - Earnings and Sales are 1) Consistent, 2) Strong, and 3) Growing At A Steady Rate.

Year	Sales	
2008	\$1,157,000,000	
2009	\$1,231,000,000	6%
2010	\$1,610,000,000	31%
2011	\$1,844,000,000	15%
2012	\$2,034,000,000	10%
2013	\$2,206,000,000	8%
2014	\$2,301,000,000	4%
2015	\$2,274,000,000	-1%
2016	\$1,931,000,000	-15%
2017	\$1,796,000,000	-7%
2018	\$1,954,000,000	9%


Certainty Rating: 85%



Explanation: Sales have generally been growing over the past decade but off all time highs in 2014ish.

Year	Earning	S
2008	\$134,000,000	
2009	\$192,000,000	43%
2010	\$321,000,000	67%
2011	\$389,000,000	21%
2012	\$229,000,000	-41%
2013	\$393,000,000	72%
2014	\$497,000,000	26%
2015	\$306,000,000	-38%
2016	\$339,000,000	11%
2017	\$304,000,000	-10%
2018	\$390,000,000	28%

Certainty Rating:	90%




Explanation: Same, earnings have been growing over last decade.

Year	Sales Per	Share
2008	\$15.85	
2009	\$16.86	6%
2010	\$22.05	31%
2011	\$24.92	13%
2012	\$27.49	10%
2013	\$29.81	8%
2014	\$31.09	4%
2015	\$30.73	-1%
2016	\$26.09	-15%
2017	\$18.14	-30%
2018	\$14.92	-18%

Certainty Rating:


90%




Sales Per Share Growth

Explanation: The increase in shares outstanding has dropped this dramatically to decade lows. But not bad at all since the share count almost doubled!

Year	Earnings Pe	r Share
2008	\$1.84	
2009	\$2.63	43%
2010	\$4.40	67%
2011	\$5.26	20%
2012	\$3.09	-41%
2013	\$5.31	72%
2014	\$6.72	26%
2015	\$4.14	-38%
2016	\$4.58	11%
2017	\$3.07	-33%
2018	\$2.98	-3%






Explanation: EPS has not dropped terribly in relation to the shares outstanding AND overall it is trending up over the decade (although down a bit in the last few years).


Margins - Are 1) Consistent, 2) Strong, and 3) Growing At A Steady Rate.

Year	Gross Pro	fit
2008	\$285,779,000	25%
2009	\$380,379,000	31%
2010	\$549,010,000	34%
2011	\$625,116,000	34%
2012	\$451,548,000	22%
2013	\$507,380,000	23%
2014	\$616,668,000	27%
2015	\$529,842,000	23%
2016	\$438,337,000	23%
2017	\$389,732,000	22%
2018	\$382,984,000	20%
	Average:	26%
	High:	34%
	Low:	20%
	Certainty Rating:	75%




Explanation: The margins have been trending down and are currently at the 10 year low value. That said...not going out of business.

Year	Operating M	argin
2008	\$152,000,000	13%
2009	\$222,000,000	18%
2010	\$352,000,000	22%
2011	\$413,000,000	22%
2012	\$394,000,000	19%
2013	\$444,000,000	20%
2014	\$544,000,000	24%
2015	\$462,000,000	20%
2016	\$366,000,000	19%
2017	\$329,000,000	18%
2018	\$318,000,000	16%
	Average:	19%
	High:	24%
	Low:	13%
	Certainty Rating:	75%



Explanation: The operating margins are pretty much at an all time low (minus the low value in 2008) and at 16% well off the highs of 2014 24%. That said...not going out of business.

Cap Ex - Is Consistent.




Certainty Rating:

Low:

6%

80%




Explanation: Cap Ex spending has been lower in recent years and is currently still lower than the average. It is not terribly consistent but it is likely due to ebbs and flows in the cycle (and needs to invest accordingly). They have had good returns on their investments so I don't necessarily see these shifts as bad.

Free Cash Flow - Is 1) Consistent, 2) Strong, and 3) Growing At A Steady Rate.

Year	Free Cash F	low
2008	\$55,000,000	5%
2009	-\$45,260,000	-4%
2010	\$229,220,000	14%
2011	\$287,860,000	16%
2012	\$131,720,000	6%
2013	\$340,400,000	15%
2014	\$420,320,000	18%
2015	\$436,600,000	19%
2016	\$532,800,000	28%
2017	\$630,630,000	35%
2018	\$457,795,699	23%
	Average:	16%






Explanation: No issues here. Free cash flows have been growing steadily.

Debt To Equity - Is 1) Consistent, and 2) Low (and/or Lowering Quickly).

Year	Debt To Equ	ıity
2008		
2009	132%	
2010	154%	17%
2011	110%	-29%
2012	112%	2%
2013	100%	-11%
2014	60%	-40%
2015	67%	12%
2016	45%	-33%
2017	41%	-9%
2018	34%	-17%
Average:	86%	
High:	154%	
Low:	34%	
	Certainty Rating:	100%




Explanation: Debt has been dropping like a rock (and has been a concerted effort for the company).


Year **Payout Ratio** 2008 2009 98% 48% -51% 2010 2011 44% -9% 2012 68% 56% 2013 61% -10% 54% -13% 2014 2015 76% 41% 2016 117% 55% 50% -57% 2017

76%

2018



51%



Explanation: The MLP structure forces the company to payout a % of earnings in order to maintain the tax advantage. So the payout ratio is high but also uncontollable.

Tells Us Whether The People Closest To The Business Are 1) Buying (And At Attractive Valuations) and/or 2) Owners.

Shares Outstanding / Buyback Program

Shares Outstanding	
Peak Past 10 Years	131,000,000
Current Outstanding	130,200,000
Shares Added/Subtracted	-800,000
% Added/Subtracted	-1%

Current Buyback Program	
Years	0
Value	\$ 0
Potential Shares At Current Price	0
Potential Shares Repurchased	0%

Certainty Rating:	100%
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Year	Shares Out
2008	73,000,000
2009	73,000,000
2010	73,000,000
2011	74,000,000
2012	74,000,000
2013	74,000,000
2014	74,000,000
2015	74,000,000
2016	74,000,000
2017	99,000,000
2018	131,000,000

Explanation: When I bought this one dataset says 130 million shares and another said 85 million. Just issued 10 million shares (was at steady 74 m). From Q3 earnings Balance Sheet "Limited Partners - Common Unitholders 130,704,217 and 74,375,025 units outstanding, respectively". Regardless, this was confusing initially. No buyback plan in place.

Insider Ownership / Activity

Ownership (In Millions)				
Institutions 1,239,820,000			64%	
N	1utual Funds	278,910,000	14%	
	Insiders	414,730,000	21%	
	Total	1.933.460.000		

Yes

100%

	Insider Buying /	′ Sellin
6 Month Buying	Yes	

Certainty Rating:

6 Month Selling

Ownership

Institutions Mutual Funds Insiders

Explanation: 21% insider ownership and insiders are still buying (with Directors buying in \$19.55-\$19.85).

Test #7 - GOOD BUSINESS CHECK - Do important metrics indicating a 'good business' show that it is indeed a 'good business'?

Tells Us The Business Has A Good Financial Model And Whether Management Understands How To Operate It Effectively Compared To The Industry and Market.

Return "Moat" Assessment - Not A "Low Return" Business. Charlie Munger says that eventually over time returns will match ROIC.

Return on Inve	sted Capital	Company (10 Year Average)	24.0%
Year		Company (10 Year High)	49.0%
2008	49.0%	Company (10 Year Low)	9.9%
2009	35.4%	Company (Current Year/TTM)	24.6%
2010	28.7%	,	
2011	25.9%	Industry (Current Year)	13.6%
2012	17.9%		
2013	18.1%	Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year)	14.1%
2014	21.5%	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
2015	9.9%	Explanation: Used Coal & Related Energy	
2016	15.5%	3,	
2017	18.2%		
2018	24.6%		

Yes	Is the ROIC equal to or higher than the overall market?
Yes	Is the ROIC equal to or higher than the industry?
Yes	Has the ROIC always been positive?

Is the ROIC steady (not really far from average, or high/low)? Yes

Company (10 Year	n Equity	Return on
Company (10 Year		Year
Company (10 Year		2008
Company (Current		2009
	63.9%	2010
Industry (Current Y	56.2%	2011
	34.0%	2012
Overall Market Wit	34.5%	2013
	37.9%	2014
Explanation	15.6%	2015
	24.3%	2016
	24.7%	2017
	31.8%	2018

Company (10 Year Average)	35.9%
Company (10 Year High)	63.9%
Company (10 Year Low)	15.6%
Company (Current Year/TTM)	31.8%
Industry (Current Year)	7.1%
Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year)	12.5%
Explanation: NA	

Yes Is the ROE equal to or higher than the industry?

Has the ROE always been positive? Yes

Is the ROE steady (not really far from average, or high/low)? Yes

Return on	Assets	Company (10 Year Average)
Year		Company (10 Year High)
2008	15.5%	Company (10 Year Low)
2009	12.6%	Company (Current Year/TTM)
2010	19.4%	
2011	18.8%	Industry (Current Year)
2012	12.2%	
2013	13.2%	Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year)
2014	16.0%	
2015	6.7%	Explanation: NA
2016	11.1%	
2017	12.5%	
2018	17.2%	

Yes Is the ROA equal to or higher than the overall market?

Yes Is the ROA equal to or higher than the industry?

Yes Has the ROA always been positive?

Yes Is the ROA steady (not really far from average, or high/low)?

Asset Turnover		
1.34		
1.18		
1.26		
1.14		
1.10		
1.08		
1.04		
0.98		
0.85		
0.81		
0.88		

Company (10 Year Average)	1.06
Company (10 Year High)	1.34
Company (10 Year Low)	0.81
Company (Current Year/TTM)	0.88

14.1% 19.4% 6.7% 17.2%

2.7%

4.4%

Explanation: NA

Yes Is the Asset Turnover consistent over time?
No Is the Asset Turnover improving (trending higher)?

Certainty Rating: 93% Explanation: NA

Business "Moat" Assessment - Not A "Mediocre" Business

Net Mar	gin %
Year	
2008	11.6%
2009	10.7%
2010	15.4%
2011	16.4%
2012	11.1%
2013	12.2%
2014	15.4%
2015	6.9%
2016	13.0%
2017	15.4%
2018	19.5%

Compa	ny (10 Year Average)	13.4%
Compa	ny (10 Year High)	19.5%
Compa	ny (10 Year Low)	6.9%
Compa	ny (Current Year/TTM)	19.5%
Industry	(Current Year)	5.0%
Overall	Market Without Financials (Current Veen)	0.50/
Overall	Market Without Financials (Current Year)	9.5%
	Explanation: NA	

Yes	Is the Net Margin % equal to or higher than the overall market?
Yes	Is the Net Margin % equal to or higher than the industry?
Yes	Has the Net Margin % always been positive?
Yes	Is the Net Margin % steady (not really far from average, or high/low)?

Gross Margin %		
Year		
2008	24.7%	
2009	30.9%	
2010	34.1%	
2011	33.9%	
2012	22.2%	
2013	23.0%	
2014	26.8%	
2015	23.3%	
2016	22.7%	
2017	21.7%	
2018	19.6%	

Company (10 Year Average)	25.7%
Company (10 Year High)	34.1%
Company (10 Year Low)	19.6%
Company (Current Year/TTM)	19.6%

Explanation: NA

Yes Has the Gross Margin % always been positive?
No Is the Gross Margin % generally improving?

Yes Is the Gross Margin % steady (not really far from average, or high/low)?

Operating N	Margin %	Company (10 Year Average)
Year		Company (10 Year High)
2008	13.1%	Company (10 Year Low)
2009	18.0%	Company (Current Year/TTM)
2010	21.9%	
2011	22.4%	Industry (Current Year)
2012	19.4%	
2013	20.1%	Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year)
2014	23.6%	
2015	20.3%	Explanation: NA
2016	19.0%	
2017	18.3%	
2018	16.3%	

Yes	Is the Operating Margin % equal to or higher than the overall market?
Yes	Is the Operating Margin % equal to or higher than the industry?
Yes	Has the Operating Margin % always been positive?
No	Is the Operating Margin % generally improving?
Yes	Is the Operating Margin % steady (not really far from average, or high/low)?
No	Is The Business Unique? Or Does It Have Something That Makes It Unique?
Yes	Price Is Not The Single Most Important Motivating Factor In Purchase Of Product.
Yes	Prices Can Be Adjusted For Inflation?
Yes	Is Revenue "Safe" (Long-Term Contracts, Long-Term Retention, Don't Have To Resell Everything Every Time)?
No	Does The Company Have Strong/Recognized Brands?
No	Is There An Attachment To The Companies Brand(s)? Is There An Identifiable Consumer Monopoly?

Certainty Rating: 72%

Explanation: They don't pull it out of the ground (or open new production lines) until contracts are secured.

19.3% 23.6% 13.1% 16.3%

8.4%

11.3%

<u>Competition "Moat" Assessment</u> - Not A "Commodity-Type" Business

No Is Business Competition Free? There Is Not A Company That Directly Competes With This One.

No Is Business Competition Free? There Is Not A Presence Of Multiple Producers In Industry?

Yes Is Business Competition Free? There Is Not Substantial Excess Production Capacity In Industry?

Yes It Would Be Hard To Start A Company To Compete With This Business. There Are Large Barriers To Entry To This Business.

Yes It Would Be Hard To Make A Dent In Business Without The Most Money and Best Management Talent.

Certainty Rating: 60%

Explanation: There are other companies but most are not clamoring to get into the coal industry.

Leverage Assessment - Is The Business Conservatively Financed (Providing Additional Margin Of Safety...Oh And Saving Money)?

Financial Leverage		
(Asset To Equity Ratio) Year		
2008		
	0.00	
2009	3.28	
2010	3.29	
2011	2.78	
2012	2.77	
2013	2.49	
2014	2.25	
2015	2.39	
2016	2.02	
2017	1.94	
2018	1.78	

Company (10 Year Average)	2.50
Company (10 Year High)	3.29
Company (10 Year Low)	1.78
Company (Current Year/TTM)	1.78

Explanation: NA

Yes Is the Financial Leverage consistent over time?
Yes Is the Financial Leverage improving (ie lowering)?

Debt To Equity		Shares	Company (10 Year Average)	77.7%
Year			Company (10 Year High)	154.0%
2008	0%	73,000,000	Company (10 Year Low)	0.0%
2009	132%	73,000,000	Company (Current Year/TTM)	34.0%
2010	154%	73,000,000		
2011	110%	74,000,000	Industry (Current Year)	168.0%
2012	112%	74,000,000	,	
2013	100%	74,000,000	Overall Market Without Financials (Current Year)	119.0%
2014	60%	74,000,000	,	
2015	67%	74,000,000	Explanation: NA	
2016	45%	74,000,000		
2017	41%	99,000,000		
2018	34%	131,000,000		

Yes	Is The Debt To Equity Low Versus Static Measure (Less Than 50%)?
Yes	Is The Debt To Equity Low Versus Market (Less Than Market)?
Yes	Is The Debt To Equity Low Versus Industry (Less Than Industry)?
Yes	Has The Debt To Equity Lowered Over Time?
Yes	The Company Is Not Adding Debt In Order To Increase ROE.
Yes	The Company Is Not Adding Debt In Order To Do Share Buybacks.

Certainty Rating: 100% Explanation: NA

Compounding Assessment - Is The Company A (Or Going To Continue To Be A) Compounder?

Yes Does The Company Retain Its Earnings (Ideally No Payouts Unless There Is No Additional Expansion Opportunity)?
Yes Is The Company Able To Spend Little On Maintaining Current Operations (Is CapEx Rebuilding Or Expansion)?
Yes Is Company Reinvesting Earnings In New Businesses, Expansion Of Existing Businesses (That Will Increase Value)?
Yes Is Company Reinvesting Earnings In Share Repurchases (That Will Increase Value)?

Certainty Rating: 100%

Explanation: Distributes earnings but is able to invest them if they'd rather. Good and bad with that but likely not making huge investments (declining industry) so fine.

Management Assessment - Does The Company's Management Add Value To The Business?

Yes	Management Has Candor And Can Admit Mistakes
Yes	Management Has Been In Place For Some Time
Yes	Management Does What It Says It Will Do
Yes	Management Knows The Business (Rarely Surprised)
Yes	Management Is Allocating Capital (Reinvested Earnings) Into Businesses, Expansion That Will Increase Value.
Yes	Profitability Is Not Almost Entirely Dependent Upon Management's Abilities To Efficiently Utilize Tangible Assets (Idiot Run Test).

Certainty Rating: 100% Explanation: I love this management

GOOD BUSINESS CHE	CK
Return "Moat" Assessment:	93%
Business "Moat" Assessment:	72%
Competition "Moat" Assessment:	60%
Leverage Assessment:	100%
Compounding Assessment:	100%
Management Assessment:	100%
	88%

88%

Explanation: NA

Test #8 - N	MY GUT				
			Trust My GutI	t Is Large And In Charge (Unfortunately)!	
Other's Ar	Annual Report Latest 10K Latest 10Q (+)		Other's Analysis -	Outsiders Available Analyst Reports Morningstar Reports Internet Searches, News, Articles	
	Certainty Rating:	100%	Explanation:	NA	
	•		_		
PROS					
See page	= 1				
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	Certainty Rating:	100%	Explanation:	NA	
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Explanation: NA


Certainty Rating:

100%

Test #9 - TECHNICALS / TIMING

Do Weekly Technicals Point Towards An Attractive Entry Point (Either Oversold / Turning / Trending)

Point And Figure



Certainty Rating: 100%

Explanation: I like a lot about the weekly chart on this one.

There are some large drawdowns and these got into large oversold positions. The run back up to generally overbought has put it into its current range and seems to have been tested a few times recently. One major selloff (down to the \$14.00 level) occurred in early 2018 and then there were some big spike selling in later 2018 and the price has recovered each time from the oversold (or near oversold territory). So I think their is good support for the current price (or a

price support going back a long time.

bit lower). So between \$16 and \$19 has a lot of

Weekly Candlestick



50/200 Day Trend Line (Crossing?)

Certainty Rating: 100%

Explanation: NA

RSI (Cheap, Falling Knife?)

Certainty Rating: 100%

Explanation: NA

MACD (Crossing?)

Certainty Rating: 100%

Explanation: NA

Money Flow (Oversold?)

Certainty Rating: 100%

Explanation: NA